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THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT: SUGGESTIONS FOR MAKING INFORMATION
AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC
CHARLES

H. KocH,

JR.*

Free and current information about the operations of the government is the keystone of a democracy. Without it, visions of impropriety and intrigue lead to mistrust. Without it, conjecture replaces
knowledge as the basis for electoral decisions. Yet the whole structure
of the federal bureaucracy sits, seemingly immovable, upon the public
records of the government.
Two major congressional efforts have been undertaken to lift this
mass of bureaucratic diffidence from the public records. The first of
these efforts was section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act,
which was passed in 1946.1 That provision directed agencies to make
available more information about the law developing within them, but
left the bureaucrats as the final judge of their own compliance. For
this reason, section 3 as then worded did not significantly open the
workings of government even to those directly affected by the administrative process. Therefore, Congress enacted the Freedom of Information Act in 1966.2 Promulgated as an amendment to section 3, it
was intended to make disclosure the rule - permitting records to be
withheld only if they fell within one of nine exemptions.'
* Attorney, Office of the General Counsel, Federal Trade Commission; B.A.,
1966, University of Maryland; J.D., 1969, George Washington University.
1. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237. The Federal Administrative
Procedure Act (the "APA") was passed for the purpose of establishing uniform
standards and procedures for the activities of all administrative agencies. Section 3
of the APA was the public information section.
2. Act of July 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250, as amended, Act of
June 5, 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-23, 81 Stat. 54, amending Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324,
60 Stat. 237 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970)). The Freedom of Information Act
was enacted July 4, 1966, to become effective July 4, 1967. The codification contained
some changes in the internal structure from the original enactment.
3. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970).
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The Act provides for judicial review of agency denial of access
to identifiable records; it also specifically requires the agency to bear
the burden of justifying the denial. Furthermore, it empowers the
courts to enjoin agencies from wrongfully withholding records. 4
However, more than added effectiveness separates the Act from
the original section 3, for Congress held out the hope with its enactment that -the mechanisms of this democratic government would become visible. Congress intended the Act to provide the means by
which the electorate could obtain meaningful information with which
to judge the performance of those operating the government. Thus,
while consideration of the original section 3 focused upon the lawmaking function of each agency, in the contemplation of the new legislation the emphasis was placed on the right of the public to know how
the government was performing. Unfortunately, despite this clear intent, utilization of the Act has been limited to providing those directly
involved in the administrative process with some means of obtaining
the information necessary to protect their special interests. The failure
of the Act to accomplish its goal stems more from congressional misdirection and ad hoc interpretations by the courts than from conscious
efforts by the bureaucracy.
This article will seek out interpretations of the Act which will
transcend the needs of individual applicants and provide effective ways
to open the government both to parties involved in its proceedings and
to the electorate. In addition, the article will venture more ambitious
revisions, less closely related to the present Act, which should implement the goals of a public information system. 5
I.

DEVELOPMENT

AND IMPLEMENTATION

OF A

PUBLIC INFORMATION SYSTEM

The 1930's saw an increase in the breadth of activities performed
by administrative agencies which was so great that it became necessary
to investigate possible procedures for controlling these activities. Of
4. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) (1970).
5. The Act has already been the subject of some very learned critiques. Chief
among them is the prophetic work by Professor Davis following on the heels of its
enactment. See Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CH.
L. REV. 761 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Davis]. See also Giannella, Agency Procedures Implementing the Freedom of Information Act: A Proposal for Unfair
Regulations, 23 AD. L. REV. 217 (1970) [report prepared for the Administrative
Conference of the United States; hereinafter cited as Giannella] ; Katz, The Games
Bureaucrats Play: Hide and Seek Under the Freedom of Information Act, 48 TEXAS
L. REv. 1261 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Katz].
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primary concern was the secrecy with which agencies could operate. In
1935, Congress enacted the Federal Register Act' to provide for publication of administrative regulation in the same manner as other laws.
Late in the decade, President Roosevelt appointed a blue ribbon
committee headed by the Attorney General7 to develop procedures for
the administrative agencies.' This committee found that one necessary
reform was the elimination of the secrecy with which law was being
created by federal agencies. The Committee stated that "[a]n important and far-reaching defect in the field of administrative law has
been simple lack of adequate public information concerning its substance and procedure." 9 The Committee pointed to the natural distrust
for secret government decision making as a major source of the criticism of the administrative process.' ° Although it praised the Federal
Register Act, it proposed even broader disclosure of the law created
in varied forms within the federal government. Its recommended legislation would have required the publication of policies and interpretations, and the promulgation of rules for making materials available to
the public."
6. 44 U.S.C. § 150j (1970) (originally enacted as Act of July 26, 1935, ch. 417,
49 Stat. 500).
7. On February 24, 1939, Attorney General Murphy, at the direction of the
President, appointed "The Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure" to investigate the need for procedural reform in the various administrative
tribunals and to suggest improvements in administrative procedure. The Report of the
Committee was transmitted to the Senate on January 29, 1941. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
COMM.

ON

ADMINISTRATIVE

PROCEDURE,

REPORT,

ADMINISTRATIVE

PROCEDURE

IN

GOVERNMENT AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 213 (1941) [hereinafter
cited as ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT].
8. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 245 (1946) [hereinafter cited as
APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
9. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 7, at 25.
10. The report stated:
Such a state of affairs will at least partially explain a number of types of criticisms
of the administrative process. Where necessary information must be secured
through oral discussion or inquiry, it is natural that parties should complain of
Ia government of men.' Where public regulation is not adequately expressed
in
rules, complaints regarding 'unrestrained delegation of legislative authority' are
aggravated. Where the process of decision is not clearly outlined, charges of 'starchamber proceedings' may be anticipated. Where the basic outlines of a fair hearing are not affirmatively set forth in procedural rules, parties are less likely to feel
assured that opportunity for such a hearing is afforded. Much has been done in
recent years to alleviate these difficulties. But much more can readily be done by
the agencies themselves.

Id.
11. Id. at 195.

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. XXXII

Although the majority report of the Committee seemed to focus
its efforts upon exposing secret law, the minority report developed a
position more sensitive to the needs of the democratic system for information concerning the interworkings of the government. Its recommendation for a public information section was that "matters of record
shall be made available to all interested persons," except that "personal
data" which the agency finds based upon good cause and statutory
authorization should be treated as confidential. 1 2 The key words are
"interested persons;" the use of the phrase "[t]he press and other
interested persons"'" indicates that the term "interested persons" was
to be given a broad meaning intended to open access to others besides
those directly affected by a specific agency decision.
Section 3 of the APA
Final action on the original APA proposals was delayed by the
Second World War. When Congress returned to reforming the
administrative process, the public information section was again considered to be of great importance. However, a change in emphasis
appeared in the legislative comments on the value and purpose of the
public information section. At this point, Congress seemed more concerned with opening the workings of the government to the electorate
in general than it had been previously. 4 Despite this concern, the
public information system finally adopted, section 3 of the APA, pro12. Id. at 221.

The minority proposal also permitted agencies to withhold

"publicity . . . during the preliminary or investigative phases of adjudication."

Id.

13. Id.
14. The report of the Senate Judiciary Committee stated:
The public information requirements of section 3 are in many ways among the
most important, far-reaching and useful provisions of the bill .... [T]hese provisions require agencies to take the mystery out of administrative procedures by
stating it. The section has been drawn upon the theory that administrative operations and procedures are public property which the general public, rather than
a few specialists or lobbyists, is entitled to know or to have the ready means of
knowing with definiteness and assurance.
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT,

S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1945)

(emphasis added). The report of the

House Judiciary Committee stated:

The public-information provisions of section 3 are of the broadest application
because, while some functions and some operations may not lend themselves to
formal procedure, all administrative operations should as a matter of policy be
disclosed to the public except as secrecy may obviously be required or only internal agency 'housekeeping' arrangements may be involved.
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE

H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 17-18 (1946).

PROCEDURE ACT,
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vided a method of disclosure only for those persons properly and
directly affected by the agency action.' 5
Proposals to amend section 3 appeared soon after enactment of
the APA. These proposals were precipitated by the realization that
section 3 had not become a disclosure provision, but rather a statutory excuse for withholding government records.' 6 Section 3 permitted numerous excuses for nondisclosure. Agencies could withhold
information if secrecy was required "in the public interest" or if the
records related "solely to the internal management of an agency."
Information could also be held confidential "for good cause found,"
and even where no good cause could be found for secrecy or confidentiality the records were available only to persons "properly and directly
concerned." These broad phrases were not defined in the section nor
15. Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 237. Section 3 provided:
Except to the extent that there is involved (1) any function of the United States
requiring secrecy in the public interest or (2) any matter relating solely to the
internal management of an agency(a) RULES. - Every agency shall separately state and currently publish in
the Federal Register (1) descriptions of its central and field organization including delegations by the agency of final authority and the established places at
which, and methods whereby the public may secure information or make submittals
or requests; (2) statements of the general course and method by which its functions are channeled and determined, including the nature and requirements of all
formal or informal procedures available as well as forms and instructions as to
the scope and contents of all papers, reports, or examinations; and (3) substantive rules adopted as authorized by law and statements of general policy or
interpretations formulated and adopted by the agency for the guidance of the
public, but not rules addressed and served upon named person in accordance with
law. No person shall in any manner be required to resort to organization or procedure not so published.
(b) OPINIONS AND ORDERS. - Every agency shall publish or, in accordance
with published rule, make available to public inspection all final opinions or orders
in the adjudication of cases (except those required for good cause to be held confidential and not cited as precedent) and all rules.
(c) PUBLIC RECORDS. - Save as otherwise required by statute, matters of
official record shall in accordance with published rule be made available to persons
properly and directly concerned except information held confidential for good
cause found. (emphasis added)
16. "Section 3 of the Administrative Procedure Act . . . though titled 'Public
Information' and clearly intended for that purpose, has been used as an authority for
withholding, rather than disclosing, information. Such a 1800 turn was easy to accomplish given the broad language of [Section 3]." HOUSE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT
OPERATIONS, CLARIFYING AND PROTECTING THE RIGHT OF THE PUBLIC TO INFORMATION,

H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1966) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.
No. 1497]. See also ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM ON THE PUBLIC INFORMATION
SECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT (1967), reprinted in 20 AD. L. REV.
263 (1963) [hereinafter cited as ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, page references
to the AD. L. REv.].
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in its legislative history.'" There was no provision for review of an
agency's wrongful denial of access to the records. In sum, section 3
was a public information statute only to the extent agencies desired
that it be, and they didn't.'
Freedom of Information Act
The failure of section 3 to provide access to government records
even to those directly affected by agency action resulted in the congressional effort which culminated in the Freedom of Information Act. 9
One of the key changes was to require disclosure of all information in
20
government records not specifically defined in the nine exemptions.
Hence, it is said that the Act was intended as a disclosure statute, not
2
a withholding statute. '
The new legislation established a review procedure which provides judicial enforcement of the disclosure policy established by
Congress. The district courts were authorized to grant de novo review
of denials of access to records and empowered to enjoin agencies from
improper denials. The agencies were required to bear the burden of
17. See Bennett, The Freedom of Information Act, is it a Clear Public Record
Law?, 34 BROOKLYN L. REV. 72, 73 (1967).
18. The intent of Congress was clearly to direct agencies to make more information available: "The public information section is basic, because it requires agencies
to take the initiative in informing the public."

APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra

note 8, at 251. Congress apparently felt that their direction would be enough. Of
course, the bureaucracy virtually ignored the public information section. Sherwood,
The Freedom of Information Act: A Compendium for the Military Lawyer, 52
MILITARY L. REV. 103, 104 (1971).
19. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970). See generally 80 HARV. L. REV. 909 (1967).
20. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970) sets forth the nine exemptions as follows:
(1) matters specifically required by Executive Order to be kept secret in
the interest of the national defense or foreign policy;
(2) matters related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of
an agency;
(3) matters specifically exempted by statute;
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from
a person and privileged or confidential;
(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums:
(6) personnel and medical files, the disclosure of which would constitute a
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(7) investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes;
(8) matters contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition
reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions;
(9) geological and geophysical information and data.
21. Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 679 (D.C. Cir.), applicationfor stay denied,
404 U.S. 1204 (1971) ; See Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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showing that denials were "specifically" permitted by one of the nine
exemptions.2 2
In the most important change, however, access to government
records was broadened under the Act by permitting "any person" to
request government records, rather than only those persons "properly
and directly concerned" as under prior section 3. This change in language indicates a shift of emphasis from providing access to citizens
directly affected by an agency action to establishing a more informed
electorate - an opening of the bureaucracy to any interested citizen.
In this new legislative effort the intent was to provide the public
with ready access to government information. The Senate Judiciary
Committee found that "[a]lthough the theory of an informed electorate is vital to the proper operation of a democracy, there is nowhere
in our present law a statute which affirmatively provides for that information."2 Thus, Congress set out to bring into the open "the
hundreds of departments, branches, and agencies. '2 4 Looking into
the full history of the Act, the Second Circuit later found that "the
ultimate purpose was to enable the public to have sufficient information
in order to be able, through the electoral process, to make intelligent,
informed choices with respect to the nature, scope, and procedure of
federal government activities."2 5 It is the electoral process and not
just the administrative process for which the information was to be
provided. It is the informed electorate as well as the informed party
to an agency proceeding which occupied the foreground in the Act's
legislative history.
The Act and the Informed Electorate
Although the expressed purpose of the Act was to provide the
electorate with information, it is not well suited for the task.2 6 It is,
22. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (3) (1970).
23. SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY,

CLARIFYING AND PROTECTING THE RIGHT

OF THE PUBLIC TO INFORMATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES,

S. REP. No. 813, 89th

Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967).
24. Id. In signing the bill into law, President Johnson stated that "a democracy
works best when the people have all the information that the security of the nation
permits." Statement by President Johnson Upon Signing Public Law 89-487 on July 4,
1966, as reproduced in ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM. supra note 16, at 263.
25. Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813, 816 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 125
(1972). The court stated: "[F]or the great majority of different records, the public
as a whole has a right to know what its Government is doing." 460 F.2d at 816,
quoting S. REP. No. 813, supra note 23, at 5-6 (emphasis added by the court).
26. The Act is universally considered to be the product of poor draftsmanship.
Professor Davis announced on the heels of its enactment: "The Act is difficult to
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of course, unrealistic to suppose that citizens in general will have the
interest or the time to examine agency records to make themselves
better informed voters. But two groups who digest information for
mass consumption, researchers and the media, have not been sufficiently accommodated by the Act.
Researchers
A study reported by Ralph Nader found that "most agencies have
a two-pronged information policy - one towards citizens and one towards the special interest groups that form the agency's regulated
constituency."27 A survey conducted by the Administrative Conference 28 generally supports the conclusions of the Nader study. 2' This

bias, however, is not the result of a conspiracy between special interests
and the agencies but is rather the natural result of the Act.
Reliance on judicial enforcement is one reason for this bias.
Judicial review is more realistically available to agency clientele than
to most researchers. There is usually a tangible benefit in compelling
disclosure to a party in an agency proceeding. Hence, the possibility
of court action by a disappointed member of an agency's clientele is
far greater than that of action by a disappointed private citizen engaged in research.
In addition, compliance with the Act requires considerable re-source allocation. Because the Act permits some documents to be
withheld, and because most agency statutes or rules require certain
documents to be confidential, a large amount of staff resources must
be committed to the segregation of documents before release. Agency
officials are understandably reluctant to commit resources to such tasks.
They become more reluctant where the request is not directly related
interpret, and in some respects it is badly drafted." Davis, supra note 5, at 761.
Although courts have differed in interpretation, they have agreed, if sometimes implicitly, with Davis' observations: "Unquestionably the Act is awkwardly drawn."
Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930, 932 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
"The Information Act leaves a good many things not clearly defined." Nichols v.
'United States, 325 F. Supp. 130, 138 (D. Kan. 1971).
27. Nader, Freedom from Information: The Act and the Agencies, 5 HARV. CIV.

RIGHTs-Civ. LIB. L. REV. 1, 2 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Nader].
28. The Administrative Conference was created by the Administrative Confer-

-ence Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 571-76 (1970). It is composed of representatives of the heads
-of the many administrative agencies who meet to discuss and recommend uniform
changes in administrative procedure. See generally Prettyman, Some Broader Aspects
of an Administrative Conference of the United States, 17 AD. L. REV. 48 (1964);
Note, The Administrative Conference Act, 53 GEo. L.J. 457 (1965).

29. Giannella, supra note 5, at 221.

1972]

THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

to an agency's function. This problem is aggravated by the fact that
requests from researchers are generally broader and less exact, and
hence require significant expenditures of resources. For these reasons,
student groups engaged in general research, for example, will not find
agency officials sympathetic to their requests.
The alleged two-pronged approach is also the result of the belief
held by most government officials that the Act should not be used for
"fishing expeditions." The Attorney General's memorandum on the
Act expressed this view." This opinion is not consistent with the
history and purpose of the Act; the Act was no doubt intended to assist
in permitting searching inquiries into the administrative process.3 1
However, the absence of direction and advice, except to the limited
extent provided by judicial review, makes it unlikely that bureaucrats
will be disabused of this notion.
For these reasons, the Act often fails to promote disclosure to
the researchers who in turn might help create a more informed electorate. Only the threat of judicial review by those few researchers
who have the capability can force the system to make the Act perform
32
this function.
The Media
More troublesome than the difficulty researchers experience in
obtaining information is the fact that the media has gained very little
from the Act despite its contribution to the enactment. 3 The media is
the major conduit through which general information reaches the vast
majority of the electorate, and therefore it can best provide the electorate
with quick insight into government operations. Even Nader-type
research groups must depend on the media to reach the private citizen.
At a symposium on the Act conducted by the Administrative Law
Section of the American Bar Association one newspaperman, familiar
with administrative agencies, testified as to the reasons the media has
30. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 16, at 292, states:
The requirement is thus not intended to impose upon agencies an obligation to
undertake to identify for someone who requests records the particular materials
he wants where a reasonable description is not afforded. The burden of identification is with the member of the public who requests a record, and it seems clear
that Congress did not intend to authorize 'fishing expeditions.'
31. Giannella, supra note 5, at 231; Katz, supra note 5, at 1261.
32. See Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir.), applicationfor stay denied,

404 U.S. 1204 (1971).
33. HOUSE COMM.

ON GOVERNMENT

DOM OF INFORMATION ACT,

OPERATIONS, ADMINISTRATION OF THE FREE-

H.R. REP. No. 92-1419, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1972);

Giannella, supra note 5, at 219.
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not been a particularly prominent user of the Act.34 The reporter
pointed out that the media cannot wait for the grant of access; this is
a process which takes even the speediest agency time in excess of
ordinary deadlines. Second, because of the defenses of agencies, the
media has developed alternate means for obtaining information about
newsworthy occurrences, despite the fact that this information may
be less complete and accurate than information from the agencies
themselves. Third, it is simply bad business for one member of the
media to invest money in a lawsuit to obtain information which will
be public knowledge. 3 5
Therefore, the Act has not provided the electorate with information because it has not adequately opened government operations to
researchers and media. The public information system established
by the Act fails to take cognizance of the practical problems of permitting access to these two groups of applicants.
Secret Law
Although the Act was intended to do more, it has been somewhat successful in dealing with the problem of secrecy in agency law,
making. Professor Davis, upon passage of the Act, recognized the
dichotomy between secret law and public information. He prophesied
this result in his statement: "Although the bar played a minor role in
getting the Act enacted, members of the bar and their clients will be
the principal beneficiaries. Unlike the Act's accomplishments in opening up information, its accomplishments in opening up secret law
are impressive." 3 6
The diminution of secret lawmaking is brought about by two
provisions. First, the Act requires an agency to make available for
public inspection and copying four classes of information: (1) "final
opinions, including concurring and dissenting opinions, as well as
orders, made in the adjudication of cases;" (2) "those statements of
34. L. Kohlmeier, Freedom of Information Act and the Agencies, The Journalist's
Viewpoint, 23 AD. L. REV. 129, 143 (1971). Mr. Kohlmeier is a reporter for the Wall
Street Journal and author of The Regulators: Watchdog Agencies and the Public
Interest. Accord, Statement of Ward Sinclair, Washington Bureau, Louisville CourierJournal, Hearings on U.S. Government Information Policies and Practices- Administration and Operation of the Freedom of Information Act Before the Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government
Operations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 4, at 1279 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972
Hearings].
35. But cf. Statement of John Seigenthaler, Editor, Nashville Tennessean, 1972
Hearingsat 1302; Statement of James Steele, Writer, Philadelphia Inquirer, Id. at 1294.
36. Davis, supra note 5, at 804.
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policy and interpretations which have been adopted by the agency
and are not published in the Federal Register;" (3) "administrative
staff manuals and instructions to staff that affect a member of the
public;" and (4) "a current index providing identifying information
for the public as to any matter issued, adopted, or promulgated after
July 4, 1967, and required by this paragraph to be made available or
published. 'a7 Failure to comply with this provision disables the agency
from relying on, using or citing as precedent such material unless the
party has actual notice."8 Thus, decisions and opinions of the agency
and the affected party now are available to anyone having business
with the agency.
Second, secret lawmaking is diminished under the Act by providing parties with access to agency records. The APA contains no
provision for pretrial discovery in the administrative process.3 9 The
Administrative Conference found that "most federal agencies do not
provide in their rules for any significant amount of discovery against
the agency." 40 Since the provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure for discovery do not apply to administrative agencies, there
is a gap with respect to the discovery available in an administrative
proceeding. Moreover, even those agencies which do provide some
pretrial discovery techniques in an adjudicative context may not have
discovery procedures in other types of proceedings, such as rulemaking.
The major use of the Act to date has been to fill this void and to
provide new discovery tools where none existed before. 41 The great
37. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a) (2) (1970).
38. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (a) (2) (C) (1970) states in part:
A final order, opinion, statement of policy, interpretation, or staff manual or instruction that affects a member of the public may be relied on, used, or cited as
precedent by an agency against a party . . . only if - (i) it has been indexed
and either made available or published as provided by this paragraph; or (ii) the
party has actual and timely notice of the terms thereof.
39. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 8.15 at 588 (1958).
40. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 8.15 at 392 (Supp. 1970).
41. One example of the use of the Act as a form of discovery is found in Shakespeare Co. v. United States, 389 F.2d 772 (Ct. Cl. 1968), appeal dismissed, 419 F.2d
839 (Ct. Cl. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 820 (1970). Shakespeare was locked in a
dispute with the IRS over the amount of excise tax it owed. It sought discovery of
the private rulings of the IRS. As an alternative approach, Shakespeare claimed that
access should be granted under the Act. The court found that Shakespeare could not
obtain discovery under any traditional discovery theory. It dismissed the claim under
the Act because the records were not relevant to the proceeding and because the documents were not specifically defined. The relevancy holding is clearly wrong because
there is no requirement of relevancy under the Act. The holding that the party failed
to properly define the documents is too restrictive. The restrictive decision probably
resulted because the court recognized the claim under the Act as just another discovery ploy and wished to avoid giving records under the Act which it found un-
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bulk of access requests received by federal agencies concern requests
for information to be used by private interests in proceedings before
42
the agencies.
It can be predicted that the major use of the Act will continue
to be by private parties to gain discovery of agency records. Where
there is no discovery in an agency's adjudicative proceedings, the Act
will be the only method of gaining access to agency documents. Where
there are alternatives, a party to an agency proceeding may well have
a choice of tactics. Parties will certainly attempt to utilize the Act
as a discovery tool where -the information may be or has been held
to be irrelevant for the purposes of actual discovery. 3 It will also
available under ordinary discovery. Ordinarily, an appellate court will uphold the use
of the Act for discovery purposes, particularly where no other discovery exists in the
agency's proceeding. See, e.g., Bannercraft Clothing Co. v. Renegotiation Bd., 466
F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
42. Ralph Nader found that from the effective date of the Act to early 1969, there
were forty cases brought under the Act: "Thirty-seven of these cases involved actions
by corporations or private parties seeking information relating to personal claims or
benefits. In only three cases did the suits involve a clear challenge by or for the rights
of the public at large to information." Nader, supra note 27, at 13.
Review of the reported cases under the Act to date shows fifty-five cases,
forty-one of which involve, to some degree, access to records. Of these, thirty-three
involve corporate or private interests. (The cases brought under the Act which involve validity of a rule under the publication provision are excluded, but they all
involved private interests). Six cases could be termed public information cases. See
Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (access to "Excelsior" lists of employees for the purpose of studying labor elections) ; Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067
(D.C. Cir. 1971) (access to President's Commission Report on the SST) ; Epstein v.
Resor, 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970) (access to war
papers for scholarly study) ; Skolnick v. Parsons, 397 F.2d 523 (7th Cir. 1968) (access
to report to the President from the President's Crime Commission) ; Nichols v.
United States, 325 F. Supp. 130 (D. Kan. 1971) (access to exhibits relating to Kennedy
assassination); Consumers Union v. Veterans Admin., 301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) (access to government test data for hearing aids). One would expect the requests to reflect similar ratios.
43. The use of the Act as a discovery tool may delay an enforcement proceeding
if the adjudicative proceeding must be suspended by the agencies until all the material
is supplied. One solution to this problem might be to adopt the doctrine that since
a request under the Freedom of Information Act is a separate matter from the pending adjudicatory proceeding the pendency of such a request is not a ground for
postponing the hearing in the proceeding. However, resort to this remedy may be
foreclosed as a result of a recent opinion by the District of Columbia Circuit. See
Bannercraft Clothing Co. v. Renegotiation Bd., 466 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
affirming the district court's decision to enjoin the proceedings until the request under
the Act was completed. The court concluded that the Act was intended to mitigate
the problems of those forced to litigate with agencies on the basis of incomplete information, and that the parties involved in the proceeding would suffer irreparable
injury if the proceeding were continued pending completion of the request. But cf.
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB, 433 F.2d 210, 211 (6th Cir. 1970) (per curiam).
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be used in this fashion in nonadjudicative proceedings, such as rulemaking, where the right to discovery against the agency may not exist.
The access provision of the Act has been largely limited to providing additional discovery because of inherent weaknesses in the
congressional approach to implementing a public information policy.
Knowledge of the agency and the law is almost essential to framing
a request under the Act. Only special interests have both the incentive and the resources to test denial in the courts; hence, where an
agency denies a request in the nature of discovery by an affected
party, the basis for that denial will in all likelihood be tested. Not
only has this factor led to court opinions and orders limiting agency
discretion to withhold such records, but bureaucrats have treated requests more generously where the threat of court action exists. 44
In fairness, there is nothing particularly wrong with this result. 4"
Indeed, the advantages of a better informed bar outweigh any disadSee also Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. FTC, CCH TRADE REG. REP. f 74.124
(D.D.C. 1972) (no irreparable injury shown).
If the Bannereraft opinion is limited to instances in which no other method of
discovery is available, it is sound and will no doubt have a beneficial result. If it is
applied to proceedings where discovery against the agency is provided by the agency,
then this decision will do great damage to agencies' law enforcement efforts, due to
the delay entailed in halting the proceedings while discovery is conducted.
44. "The mere threat of ... an action under the act has often released documents
that have been earlier withheld." Statement of Benny L. Kass, 1972 Hearings, supra
note 34, at 1414.
45. However, the increased publication and access might well have been accomplished under old section 3 but for the absence of judicial enforcement. Of the four
classes of documents which must be made available for public inspection, the two most
important - adjudicative orders and opinions, and statements of policy and interpretation - could have been available under section 3. Section 3(b) makes available the
first class by the language: "All final opinions and orders in the adjudicative cases"
with an exception which is maintained in the exemption in the Act. The second class,
statements of policy and interpretation, would also be included in the section 3(b)
requirement of availability of "all rules." The term "rules" is defined by the APA
as "the whole or part of an agency statement of general or particular applicability and
future effect designed to implement, interpret or prescribe law or policy or describing
the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of an agency." 5 U.S.C. § 551(4)
(1970). The phrase in the Act - "statement of policy or interpretation" - is no
more inclusive than this definition. The term "rules" is much broader than the rules
referred to in the Federal Register provision. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (1) (1970). It can
be assumed that the use of the term in (b) was not intended to be a redundancy and
hence meant everything included in the definition of rules but not covered by the
Federal Register provision. In addition, this definition of "rules" might well have been
held to include the third class of "staff manuals and instruction to staff that affect a
member of the public."
The second assault on secret law, the discovery mechanism, could also have
been developed by judicial enforcement of section 3. Section 3(c) required a grant
of access to anyone "properly and directly concerned." One who could claim to be
affected by an agency determination certainly would fall within this definition. Thus,
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vantages of opening the decisional process to private interests. In
addition, the efforts of "public interest" attorneys are surely aided
by the Act because of the likelihood that they would be denied access to
records more often than the representatives of agency clientele. Any
resulting diminution in secret lawmaking is desirable even if the process
remains obscure or unavailable to the general public. 6
Yet, even in this regard, the Act has not been totally effective.
Access has been incomplete and inequitable. Regular members of the
agencies' clientele with experienced and specialized counsel have found
the Act more useful than those with less understanding, resources,
and influence.

4

1

Reasons for Agency Evasion
Since the effective date of the Act, criticizing the agencies for the
failures of the Act has been a popular sport.4 The tendency has been
to impute ill will to bureaucrats for- their reluctance to comply.4 9
broad discovery could have resulted under this provision. There are a few exceptions,
but none of these are any broader than those in the present Act.
Consequently, had the public information section of the APA been obeyed,
little would have been accomplished by an amendment such as the Act in the diminishing secret law. More agency law would have been available for inspection and the
absence of discovery in some instances would have been cured. If this were the sum
total of the goal of the Act, an amendment to grant court jurisdiction could have cured
the problem.
46. There is a merging of both the secret law and public information problems
which should be recognized in order to interpret the Act to assist citizens in dealing
with the government. The Act should be interpreted to require publication of rules
and interpretations of broad application developed in an individual adjudicative context
on the same basis as such broadly applicable determinations are now published when
promulgated in a rulemaking proceeding. Individual adjudicative opinions generally
contain so much opinion relevant only to the case at hand that broad policy decisions
are hidden. In British Auto Parts, Inc. v, NLRB, 405 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1012 (1969), a rule promulgated by adjudication was not
required to be separately published. The right of the agency to make rules in adjudication, although criticized, has been upheld. NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. 759
(1969). However, it would greatly assist those who are not in continual contact with
the agency if such rules were separated from the individual opinion and published
as rules.
47. H.R. REP. No. 92-1419, supra note 33, at 8.
48. See, e.g., Giannella, supra note 5; Katz, supra note 5; Nader, supra note 27.
49. See, e.g., Fellmeth, The Freedom of Information Act and the Federal Trade
Commission: A Study in Malfeasance, 4 HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-Cv. LiB. L. REV. 345
(1969); Katz, supra note 5; Statements of Messrs. Robertson, Wellford and Schuck
for the Center for the Study of Responsive Law, 1972 Hearings,supra note 34, at 1251.
Indeed, there have been certain allegations of conscious avoidance of the Act which
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However, an objective reading of the Act leads to the conclusion that
the poor performance of the agencies is largely the result of inherent
defects within the Act.
The significant resource allocation required by the Act for the
release of information necessarily causes bureaucrats to attempt to
avoid or mitigate compliance. Providing information to the public is
a primary task in very few agencies. Public information considerations
must be balanced in every agency against its primary role, and there is
no federal agency which envisions itself as having the resources to
carry out the full extent of its function. In this milieu, public information activities find little support.5"
The agencies are left with the difficult task of applying ambiguous
language in specific circumstances. Therefore, it is not surprising that
agencies resolve the ambiguities in a way which is most favorable to
them or which requires the least commitment of resources. The propensity to withhold documents increases because of the unresolved
conflict between the disclosure compelled by the Act and the nondisclosure directed by the specific statutes which control the activities of
the agency.51 These conflicts are most easily resolved by withholding
all documents arguably covered by the specific statutory direction.5 2
Unfortunately, the practical problems which the Act creates for agencies
are largely ignored by the courts."3
A significant drain on the administrative process is the inevitable
result of the present draconian approach of the judiciary. Courts interpret the Act so that agencies must not only review and justify withholding each individual document, but are also often required to edit
documents so that individual portions can be released. 54 Although it
seem so elaborate that it seems improbable that most bureaucrats would actually take
the trouble. This sort of activity does not seem to be very widespread, and certainly
is not the cause of a significant amount of the failure to make records available.
50. See Statement of Robert Beatty, Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1972 Hearings,supra note 34, at 1666-67.
51. Sherwood, supra note 18, at 119.
52. See Giannella, supra note 5, at 221.
53. See Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 24 (4th Cir. 1971). Indicative of this
attitude is the court's statement: "The Freedom of Information Act was not designed
to increase administrative efficiency. .. ."
54. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
But see Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 41 U.S.L.W. 4201 (U.S. Jan.
22, 1973), holding that "in camera inspection . . . to sift out so-called 'non-secret components'" [41 U.S.L.W. at 4204] is not permissible where exemption one (documents
specifically required by Executive Order to be kept secret in the interest of defense)
is concerned.
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is inconceivable that Congress intended the Act to cripple agencies'
efforts to fulfill their primary duties,55 courts do not generally consider
the possibility of that result in their interpretations of the Act.
The notable exception to the typical myopic judicial decisions is
Judge Holtzoff's opinion in Bristol-Myers Co. v. Federal Trade Commission.5 6 In that case, the applicant requested numerous documents
compiled in connection with a law enforcement investigation. Judge
Holtzoff found that the definition of available documents under the
Act must be susceptible to use by lower level staff so that the release
of documents constitutes merely a ministerial function. He surmised
that, if information was to be released to "any person," the mechanics
for obtaining access could not involve agency officials on a regular
basis. 7 Unfortunately, the D.C. Court of Appeals, in reviewing Judge
Holtzoff's opinion, found unacceptable anything other than tedious
review and editing of individual documents. 58 Ignoring the rationale
of the lower court, the court simply found that the lower court had
committed error because it had "failed to examine the disputed documents, and to explain the specific justification for withholding particular items." 9 Thus, the unworkability of the Act has not been
cured, but instead has been aggravated by the courts. Agencies certainly need prodding to release information, but there is a difference
between prodding and the unrealistic compulsions which are now
imposed upon them.
55. Giannella, supra note 5, at 234-35.

56. 284 F. Supp. 745 (D.D.C. 1968), aff'd, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,

400 U.S. 824 (1970).
57. Id. at 747.
58. Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
824 (1970).
59. Id. at 938. It is interesting to note that the judicial approach has also placed
significant burdens on reviewing courts. In Bristol-Myers the appellate court returned
the case to the district court for review of all the documents. If every review is to
necessitate the court reading all the documents, then a significant drain on the already
overworked judicial system will result. Subsequent to the appellate court's direction
in Bristol-Myers the district court again refused access without inspecting the documents. See Irons v. Schuyler, 321 F. Supp. 628 (D.D.C. 1970). The court said:
This Court is not required to examine every manuscript decision of the past 100
or more years to decide in each case if there is trade secret or other material
which should be excluded. The legislative history of the Act indicates that it was
not the intent of Congress to add materially to the burden of overworked courts.
Id. at 629. This may be good reading of congressional intent and good sense, but it
does not appear to be the law. Another possible method of avoiding this overwhelming
burden is found in the approach of the court in Wechsler v. Shultz, 324 F. Supp.
1084 (D.D.C. 1971), where the court only inspected samples of the numerous records
in question.
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II.

MAKING THE ACT WORK

The assignment for those who are dissatisfied with implementation of the Act is not to lay blame but to remold the Act so that
ready access to government records can be a reality. The primary
requisite for all interpretations of the Act must be the practicality
of implementation, not just in the case at issue, but in relation to every
potential access request similar to that in the case at issue.
A major effort to enable agencies to leave compliance in the hands
of lower level staff is necessary; hence, distinctions cannot be too
sharply drawn or too complicated. Moreover, it must be possible to
make categorical decisions as to whether or not to release documents.
Compliance with the Act breaks down where every document covered
by a request must be read and edited by members of the agencies' professional staff.
Implementation of the Act must be equitable. Every request must
stand or fall on the same test. Major resource commitments or nice
distinctions necessarily lead to a value judgment as to the worth of a
particular request. The possibility of an enforcement proceeding becomes a key factor in such a situation. Finally, the more complicated
the implementation, the slower access will come. The imposition of
time limits upon agencies is an easy and unthinking approach to delay
which is unacceptable.6" The reasons behind the delay must be examined and cured.
The first effort in making the Act work must be made by the
courts. The courts must take a more practical approach to interpreting the Act. Even though the Act permits exemptions only where
itspecifically stated," its ambiguity gives the courts a broad range of
discretion in its implementation. Courts have unfortunately followed
an ad hoc approach. At present, the decision in every case involves a
balancing of the equities of the parties before the court. The Act will
become a public information statute only if the courts take a pragmatic look into the agencies' recordkeeping and limit themselves to
broad pronouncements as to the categories of information which must
be released.
The two statutory exemptions which have raised the most questions are investigatory files and internal documents. These exemptions
are particularly susceptible to practical interpretation. Perhaps this
susceptibility is a result of the fact that they grew out of concern for
the continued functioning of the agencies without significant interfer60. H.R. REP. No. 92-1419, supra note 33, at 83.
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ence from the Act. 6 ' Suggested below are interpretations which both
offer more public information and deal realistically with agencies'
problems in releasing these types of records.

Investigatory Files
62

Exemption seven, the investigatory file exemption, has been one
of the most controversial. This exemption protects from disclosure
investigatory files compiled by the agency for the purpose of pursuing
its law enforcement functions, whether civil or criminal. By the inclusion of the phrase "except to the extent available by law to a private
party," Congress intended to foreclose use of the exemption to deny
access to documents which otherwise have been made available by
Congress and the courts, such as Jencks Act statements. 6 3 The exemption's purpose is to assure that the Act does not interfere with
the law enforcement responsibilities of the agencies.
The language of the exemption seems to create a blanket
exemption for any records compiled for law enforcement purposes,
and some courts have so read it.6 However, the fact situations presented to the courts have compelled them to legislate some limitations.
The courts now stand at the crossroads between two related interpretations of the investigatory file exemption. One interpretation requires
61. See Note, Freedom of Information: the Statute and the Regulation, 56 GFo.

L.J. 18, 39-40, 47 (1967).
62. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970); "This section does not apply to matters that
are . . . (7) investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the
extent available by law to a party other than an agency .... "
63. The Attorney General interpreted 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970) as follows:
The effect of the language in exemption (7) . . . seems to be to confirm the
availability to litigants of documents from investigatory files to the extent to
which Congress and the courts have made them available to such litigants. For
example, litigants who meet the burdens of the Jencks statute (18 U.S.C. 3500
[1970]) may obtain prior statements given to an FBI agent or an SEC investigator by a witness who is testifying in a pending case; but since such statements
might contain information unfairly damaging to the litigant or other person, the
new law, like the Jencks statute, does not permit the statement to be made available to the public.
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 16, at 307. The Jencks statute was
enacted in response to the Supreme Court's grant of access to government witness
interview reports in Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957). For an interpretation of the statute see Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343 (1959).
64. In Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 93 S. Ct. 125 (1972),
the court found that the exemption was indeed unlimited. It read the legislative history
as expressing a congressional intent that any investigatory file compiled for law enforcement purposes is exempt forever. Accord, Cowles Communication, Inc. v. Department of Justice, 325 F. Supp. 726 (N.D. Cal. 1971), holding that " 'investigatory files
compiled for law enforcement purposes' need not be produced whether proceedings be
contemplated or not." 325 F. Supt. at 727.
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release of files when they are no longer current, or for some other
reason have ceased to be useful for law enforcement purposes; the
other requires release of that portion of the records, whether inactive
or current, that will not prematurely disclose the government's case.
While one of these interpretations is workable, the other has the
potential effect of interfering with the administrative process.
In Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding and Drydock Co.,6" one of the
earliest opinions to interpret the exemption, the court was faced with
a fact situation which compelled it to limit the exemption. Plaintiff
sought production of a report of an accident, which resulted in the
death of plaintiff's decedent, prepared immediately after the accident
by an investigator for the Department of Labor. The law enforcement file containing the report was four and a half years old, and no
longer useful to the government for law enforcement. The court
limited the exemption by looking beyond the language of the Act to
the legislative purpose. The primary purpose, it found, was to avoid
premature disclosure of the government's case in a law enforcement
proceeding. Because the records were not only old but had served
their public purpose, the court held that the purpose of the exemption
was not furthered by applying it to these documents.
Bristol-Myers Co. v. Federal Trade Commission6 6 suggested a
similar limitation to the exemption. There the Federal Trade Commission sought to protect documents relevant to a rulemaking proceeding involving the analgesic drug industry. The Federal Trade
Commission had originally compiled the documents for the purpose of
possible cease and desist proceedings, but later decided to deal with
the problem by an industrywide rulemaking proceeding. The documents sought were old and the original law enforcement purpose no
longer existed. Therefore, the court found that the danger of premature disclosure was not present since no real concrete possibility of
an adjudicative proceeding existed. It stated that the test was whether
the possibility of adjudication was so unlikely that the records could
67
not be said to be a law enforcement file.
Although these cases involve files which were found to be no
longer "law enforcement," the underlying "premature disclosure"
rationale has been broadened to include current files. In Wellford
v. Hardin," the district court, citing both Cooney and Bristol-Myers,
found that the test was not whether the file was still a law enforcement
65. 288 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
66. 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
67. Id. at 939.
68. 315 F. Supp. 175 (D. Md. 1970), aff'd, 444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971).
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file, but whether portions of the records sought from an investigatory
file might prematurely disclose the government's case. Plaintiff sought
four categories of documents from the Department of Agriculture:
letters of warning sent to nonfederally inspected meat or poultry
processors; information relating to detention of meat and poultry
products; biweekly reports of the Director of Slaughter Inspection
Division; and minutes of meetings of the National Food Inspection
Advisory Committee. The court postponed consideration of the last
two categories.6 9 Finding that the first two categories of documents
were already in the possession of the potential party to any proceeding, the court held that release could not result in premature disclosure
of the government's case. The appellate court upheld the district court
and agreed with its use of the "premature disclosure" rationale.7"
The expansion of the "premature disclosure" rationale by Wellford is extremely impractical. Agencies may automatically release
files when they are not current or for some other reason have ceased
being useful for law enforcement purposes. But agencies cannot reasonably be expected to release documents contained in a working law
enforcement file. Constant searches through law enforcement files
would place an impossible burden on the law enforcement resources of
every agency. More onerous is the prospect that after each new release of information to a party, such as pretrial conference, new documents would fall into the disclosable category by operation of their
disclosure to respondent. Thus, constant new releases would be necessary throughout the law enforcement proceeding.
The premature disclosure reasoning is not only impractical to
administer, but it is.also not good law. The sole basis for the rationale
is one sentence of the history of the exemption which reads: "The
Act is not intended to give a private party indirectly any earlier or
greater access to investigatory files than he would have directly in
such litigation or proceeding."'" To glean from this sentence the
conclusion that premature disclosure was the only interference from
which Congress intended to protect agency law enforcement seems
somewhat intuitive. This sentence, in context, suggests one of the
69. 315 F. Supp. 179. Upon reconsideration the court decided not to examine the
biweekly reports and the minutes, determining that they were exempt under exemption five.
70. Wellford v. Hardin, 444 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1971). However, the court limited
reliance on a premature disclosure rationale by its finding that the requested materials
were not part of an investigatory file because they were the results of agency action
which should have been released as such. 444 F.2d at 24.
71. H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 16, at 11; see Wellford v. Hardin, 315 F.
Supp. 175, 177 (D. Md. 1970).
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ways Congress did not wish the exemption to be used.72 This language should not be read to indicate Congress' intent to limit the
7
exemption solely to premature disclosure.
Courts have recognized that the exemption was intended to assure that the Act was not used to interfere with law enforcement
functions. 7' Although it is perhaps a better reading of both the language and the history of the Act to conclude that the exemption is
blanket," it is clear that, at the very least, no grant of access was
intended where it might in any way interfere with law enforcement.
The need for some limitation on the exemption is evident. 76 A
workable limitation is the test set down by the District of Columbia
Circuit in Bristol-Myers: "Thus the District Court must determine
whether the prospect of enforcement proceedings is concrete enough
to bring into operation the exemption for investigatory files, and if
so whether the particular documents sought by the company are nevertheless discoverable." 7 7 If a file is currently active then it should be
given blanket protection. But if it has passed its usefulness, then it
should be open to the public, excepting those records protected by
another exemption. This "currently active" limitation has been found
to comport with legislative intent in creating the exemption. 7" Such
a limitation would be practical. It would permit the agencies undisturbed use of the working files while freeing the information in them
when they are no longer serviceable to the agency.
72. In Cooney v. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 288 F. Supp. 708, 711 (E.D.
Pa. 1968), the court found "a primary purpose" was to prevent premature disclosure.
It did not suggest that it was the only purpose.
73. Indeed, in Benson v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 1144, 1146 (D. Neb. 1970),
the court relied on the very same sentence of the House Report to reach an opposite
conclusion.
74. The courts have tended to be sympathetic to agencies' legitimate need to protect information in their enforcement files, and have found that the Act should not be
used to interfere with the law enforcement activities of administrative agencies. "The
investigatory functions of the Agency may not be crippled by a requirement not commanded by the statute, certainly not by a requirement specifically exempted by the
statute." Evans v. DOT, 446 F.2d 821, 824 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918
(1972). In Clement Bros. v. NLRB, 282 F. Supp. 540 (N.D. Ga. 1968), the court
found that in addition to the legislative history, there is a "common sense necessity
of protecting the invetigatory function." Id. at 542.
75. Benson v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 1144 (D. Neb. 1970), found that:
"The legislative history of this statute indicates that it is not the intent of the statute
to hinder or in any way change the procedures involved in the enforcement of any law
including 'files prepared in connection with related government litigation and adjudicative proceedings.'" Id. at 1146 (emphasis added).
76. See, e.g., Nader, supra note 27, at 6; Sherwood, supra note 18, at 128.
77. Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 939-40 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 824 (1970).
78. Katz, supra note 5, at 1279.
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Informants' Privilege
The one difficulty with this approach is the protection of informants. Nowhere in the Act is there articulated an "informants'
privilege." However, courts have interpreted the investigatory file
exemption as protecting those who assist the government since identification of informants may interfere with law enforcement. 79 The
rationale behind the cases which apply the most restrictive readings of
the investigatory file exemption has been the protection of informants."0
There is no reason that the two considerations cannot be separated. Informants could be protected by a limited exemption and the
rest of the file could be released when it ceases to be active. To
accomplish this, courts need only focus on the purpose of the exemption to protect the law enforcement function. They could release the
file but protect information which would identify informants because
release of the informant information would make citizens reluctant to
inform and thereby severely impair government law enforcement. 8'
Specific recognition of an informant privilege would lead to broader
disclosure by limiting the "informant privilege" rationale to protection of informants only and not entire files.
Criminal law enforcement files
Another step which would open investigatory files would be to
recognize the natural distinction between criminal investigatory files
and civil files. The investigatory file exemption has been found not
79. Evans v. DOT, 446 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 918 (1972).
80. This rationale has been explained as follows:
For at least two reasons, of which Congress was undoubtedly aware, investigation files should be kept secret. The informant may not inform unless he knows
that what he says is not available to private persons at their request, but more important in this day of increasing concern over the conflict between the citizen's
right of privacy and the need of the Government to investigate it is unthinkable
that rights of privacy should be jeopardized further by making investigatory files
available to private persons. If these concerns are legitimate concerns, and I have
no trouble in concluding that Congress regarded them as such, then at least a part
of the purpose of enacting the investigatory file exemption is lost if the file ceases to
be confidential as soon as the threat of a law enforcement proceeding disappears.
Consequently, I hold that 'investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes' need not be produced whether proceedings be contemplated or not.
Cowles Communication, Inc. v. Department of Justice, 325 F. Supp. 726, 727 (N.D.
Cal. 1971) (footnotes omitted).
81. Informants may also be protected by exemption four. However, since no one
knows what that exemption means [ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 16,
at 300-03] it might be wiser to rely on the law relating to government investigatory
files to protect informants.
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to be limited to criminal investigation. 2 This finding is supported by
83
specific legislative statement.
However, a more severe public policy rationale exists for the
protection of criminal investigatory files.84 Broader release of civil
investigatory file information would be possible if a special interpretation of the exemption, as applicable only to criminal investigatory
files was established. Criminal law enforcement files could thereby be
given a more restrictive exemption than civil enforcement files.
Not only will this effect better protection for the government's
criminal investigatory function, but it will protect the individual rights
of those involved in criminal investigation. It is difficult to find any
reason why the public should have access to the files compiled in the
investigation of a possible individual criminal activity.
The difference in policy considerations for the releasing of civil
investigatory files and criminal investigatory files is so great that it
was a mistake for Congress to consider them together in the first place,
and it remains a mistake to continue to consider them together.
Internal Memorandum Exemption
Inter-agency or intra-agency documents are protected by exemption five.8 5 This provision exempts any internal document "which
would not be available by law to a party . . . in litigation with the
agency." Thus the preliminary test is whether a party in any conceivable context could discover the document. If not, then the document is protected by exemption five. The phrase "which would not
be available by law to a party" was intended to incorporate the
traditional privileges applied to such documents."6 The purposes of
the exemption are to protect an agency's staff from operating in a
"fish bowl," so that the staff will freely express their opinions, and
to prevent the premature disclosure of agency decisions.
The internal memoranda exemption has resulted in impractical
ad hoc judicial interpretation. Although this exemption seems to be
82. Clement Bros. v. NLRB, 282 F. Supp. 540, 542 (N.D. Ga. 1968). Barceloneta
Shoe Corp. v. Compton, 271 F. Supp. 591 (D.P.R. 1967).
83. H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 16, stated: "This exemption covers investigatory files related to enforcement of all kinds of laws, labor and securities laws as well
as criminal laws." Id. at 11.
84. Black v. Sheraton Corp., 50 F.R.D. 130, 132 (D.D.C. 1970).
85. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970) states: "This section does not apply to matters
that are ... (5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not
be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency."
86. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 16, at 304.
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a blanket exemption for internal papers, the courts have found occasion
to attempt to limit its applicability. In Consumers Union v. Veterans
Administration,7 one court reasoned from the "available by law"
phrase that an internal memorandum would be available under the
Act if it were available through discovery under rule 26(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Consumers Union sought the
results of hearing aid tests conducted by the Veterans Administration. The court, by superimposing upon the Act precedent developed
under rule 26, found that the documents would ordinarily be made
available under the Act. It relied on the traditional "government
records" exception to discovery under rule 26. Government records
had been held to be privileged where they were part of the "deliberative process that must precede any well taken decision or policy statement.""8 The court relied on the cases decided before passage of the
Act to find that the exception did not extend to factual documents. It
transferred the "policy vs. factual" document distinction to the fifth exemption and held that the exemption did not extend to factual material."0
The District of Columbia Circuit in Bristol-Myers v. FTC0
went further and held that the exemption applied only to the opinion
portions of internal documents and not to the entire document.9 The
court followed this expansion of the "purely factual" doctrine in
Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission.92 Sterling involved a request for documents relating to the Commission's investigation of a merger which was similar to the one which Sterling was
defending but which the Commission had ultimately approved. The
court held that not only purely factual documents but also purely
factual portions of policy documents must be released. Thus, under
these two cases, agencies must attempt to edit "policy" documents so
that the factual portions of an otherwise exempted document could
93
be disclosed.
87. 301 F. Supp. 796 (S.D.N.Y.

1969), appeal dismissed, 436 F.2d 1363 (2d

Cir. 1971).
88. Id. at 804.
89. Id. at 805.
90. 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
91. After holding that portions of a document may be deleted to protect confidential information, the court moved on to exemption five where it found "[a]
similarly detailed analysis is necessary." 424 F.2d at 939.
92. 450 F.2d 698 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
93. Sterling recognized that a document might be so opiniated that a deletion
approach would not be practical, but did not rule out the deletion approach in all
instances. This can be seen in the court's answer to Sterling's contention that the
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This holding is impracticable. The segregation of fact from
opinion in individual memoranda cannot be done by lower level staff
personnel. Hence, trained professionals must read every internal memorandum and edit out "purely factual" material. The mass of records
which would require such treatment would require a large resource
allocation, both by the agency and later by a reviewing court.
Even as applied categorically to separate internal documents, the
"purely factual" test places a significant burden on agencies. Request
will not be limited to relevant discovery material as under rule 26,
and hence, merely separating factual documents from policy documents
will require professional staff to read and to segregate vast quantities
of documents.
It would be more consistent with the underlying goals of the Act
if all internal memoranda were released after a certain period of time.
A theory analogous to the "currently active" theory developing under
the investigatory file exemption would be the most rational way to
limit this exemption. The "premature disclosure" rationale is more
firmly rooted under the internal memorandum exemption than under
the investigatory file exemption.9 4 Internal memoranda could, based
on the underlying theory of the exemption, lose their protection after
they were no longer pertinent to a current decision." Courts should
be no more reluctant to incorporate such a limitation than they are to
lower court had not properly considered the possibility of deleting the opinion portions
of the memorandum when it said:
we must agree, however, that there is no indication in the opinion below that the
judge considered the possibility of deleting portions of the documents. It may well
be that making deletions would not change the character of these documents, since
they appear to consist primarily of the thoughts and recommendations of the
Commission and its staff. . . . We must therefore remand the case so that the
District Court judge can consider this possibility and state in his opinion that he
has done so.
Id. at 704. The Sterling court cited Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067 (D.D.C. 1971),
which held that: "Factual information may be protected only if it is inextricably
intertwined with policy-making processes." 448 F.2d at 1077-78. However, the court
in Soucie seemed to limit this holding to separate documents and not portions of documents, and hence, it seems that both Bristol-Myers and Sterling go beyond the holding
of that case.
94. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 16, at 304 states: "The
above [legislative] quotations make it clear that the Congress did not intend to require
the production of [internal memoranda] where premature disclosure would harm the
authorized and appropriate purpose for which they are being used." (emphasis added).
95. Documents involving national security would not be automatically released
after a period of time but perhaps would be periodically subject to review. Epstein v.
Resor, 421 F.2d 930 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970).
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release "purely factual" documents. Faced with such a limitation,
agencies at least would be able to develop specialized internal rules
for coping with it. 6
The nondisclosure of policy memoranda is supported by the
desire to allow a free and frank exchange of ideas and to prevent
bureaucrats from operating in a "fish bowl." 7 However, this nondisclosure rationale is contrary to the disclosure bias of the Act.
Moreover, the necessity for protection of all internal memoranda,
either factual or opinion, is overstated. The rationale loses its vitality
as time passes after the final determination for which the document
was drafted is made. Furthermore, if the staffs of the agencies realized
that some time in the future their work product would go on the
public record, they would do a more careful, workmanlike job.98 If
they knew that their work could be questioned in the future, even
though the relevant decision was irrevocable, they would be more
accurate and unbiased, and perhaps would avoid bowing to the special
interests who, under the present system, would be the only ones likely
to know their role in the decisionmaking. The decisionmaking process
as a whole may benefit from criticism of the internal work product or
the decisional process which resulted in an official decision. Staffs will
continue to give agency officials their opinions because they must.
The worst that can happen is that agency staff and agency officials
would communicate orally more often; which may be a beneficial result
from another point of view.
In sum, the electorate would be better informed as to the factors
behind a decision if all internal documents were subject to disclosure
at some time. And agencies would find such a requirement workable
96. One point worthy of mention is the oversight in the Act in not defining
the
term "agency" differently than it is used in the rest of the Administrative
Procedure
Act. Section 551(1) excludes Congress from coverage of the APA and
state and local
governments are excluded by lack of authority over their administrative
procedure.
For the purposes of the Act, particularly exemption five, congressional,
state and local
government communications with federal agencies should also be exempt
but subject
to ultimate release as prescribed.
97. "Agency witnesses argued that a full and frank exchange of opinions
would
be impossible if all internal communications were made public. They
contended, and
with merit, that advice from staff assistants and the exchange of ideas
among agency
personnel would not be completely frank if they were forced to 'operate in
a fishbowl.'"
H.R. REP. No. 1497, supra note 16, at 10. The District of Columbia Circuit
agreed:
"In the Federal Establishment, as in General Motors or any other hierarchical
giant,
there are enough incentives as it is for playing it safe and listing with
the wind;
Congress clearly did not propose to add to them the threat of cross-examination
in a
public tribunal." Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
98. Tennessean Newspaper, Inc. v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657, 660-61 (6th Cir.
1972).
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in contrast to the present "purely factual" limitation on the exemption. The problems of bureaucrats operating in a "fish bowl" are
overstated. Thus, the limitation placed on the fifth exemption should
be founded, not on the type of document, but on the current relevancy
of the document to government policymaking. 99

Privileges
The goal of providing readily available information cannot be
permitted to steamroll legitimate concern for the protection of information obtained from outside the government which demands privileged
treatment. Clear demarcation of privileged information is also a necessary part of a public information system.
In this regard, it is unfortunate that the most unfathomable provision of the Act is exemption four, relating to privileged and confidential information.'
This exemption seems on its face to refer
99. The internal memorandum exemption presently protects the most numerous
types of law made by an agency - decisions not to prosecute or to take action. The
decision not to act is rarely accompanied by an agency opinion, and hence, the most
important decisions reached by agencies are given no background reasons. See K.
DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 103-06 (1969).
In American Mail Lines, Ltd. v.
Gulick, 411 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1969), the agency was required to disclose internal
memoranda which were incorporated into a final determination by the agency. This
opinion does not go far enough, and does not deal with instances where an agency
makes a final determination, such as a decision not to proceed in an investigation, but
does not incorporate a staff opinion. Where no agency opinion is adopted for any final
agency action, all internal memoranda which were involved in that decision should be
released to the public. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 714 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(dissenting opinion). See also United States v. Leichtfuss, 331 F. Supp. 723 (N.D.
Ill. 1971). The purpose of this is twofold: (1) It will encourage agencies to develop
opinions in formal no-action situations and; (2) it will permit those affected by the
agency decision some glimpse into the input for that decision. One should be cautioned that, as the court in Sterling found, a released staff opinion may well confuse
those outside the process as to what actually caused the agency to reach its final
determination. Bearing this in mind, perhaps a more straightforward solution to this
problem would be to require an opinion in every final agency action.
100. Discussing exemption four, Davis stated:
The Attorney General's Memorandum never acknowledges that the statutory
words of the fourth exemption have a plain meaning. Instead, the Memorandum
says that the words are
. . . susceptible of several readings, none of which is entirely satisfactory.
The exemption can be read, for example, as covering three kinds of matters:
i.e., 'matters that are * * * [a] trade secrets and [b] commercial or financial
information obtained from any person and [c] privileged or confidential.' . . .
Alternatively, clause [c] can be read as modifying clause [b]. Or, from a
strictly grammatical standpoint, it could even be argued that all three clauses
have to be satisfied for the exemption to apply. In view of the uncertain
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only to documents of a commercial nature. 0
The legislative history
demonstrates that it was not to be so limited and was intended to
10 2
include traditional privileges.
Clearer articulation of what constitutes privileged information is
necessary. The government has a duty to hold certain information in
confidence, and this information should be carefully protected. Moreover, clear definition of privileged information will permit full use of
clerical personnel to handle access. Although total cure for the Act's
deficiencies in guarding confidential information can only be accomplished by amendment, courts must take cognizance of these deficiencies
in releasing information. Courts must recognize that those who deal
with the government do not lose their rights because they submit
information to the government.
Corporations
There must be a distinction between the rights of an individual
citizen and those of a corporation. Corporate rights to deal with the
government in secret should be severely limited. Where information
is obtained from a corporation, there seem to be very few instances
where there will be reason to maintain its confidentiality. Trade secrets
should not be disclosed by the government. 0 3 Sensitive financial and
commercial information obtained from a company under no statutory
or administrative compulsion and with assurance of confidentiality
explicitly given should be withheld from disclosure.'
meaning of the statutory language, a detailed review of the legislative history
of the provision is important.
Especially fascinating is this sequence: The Attorney General (1) says the statute
is susceptible of several readings, (2) he lists those readings, and (3) he then
reaches a conclusion different from any he lists! If what he says implies that
the statute is not susceptible of the reading he adopts, then I agree! Yet I am
in basic sympathy with the Attorney General in all this because I fully agree
with the fundamental idea that underlies what he says in the passage quoted that no reading of which the Act is susceptible can feasibly govern what the
agencies will do. The fault is that of Congress, not that of the Attorney General.
Davis, supra note 5, at 788.
101. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970) states: "This section does not apply to matters that
are . . . (4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a
person and privileged or confidential."
102. "It would also include information customarily subject to the doctor-patient,
lawyer-client, lender-borrower, and other such privileges." S. REP. No. 813, supra
note 23, at 9.
103. If the information is readily available through independent research then it is
not a trade secret. Gellhorn, Business Secrets in Administrative Agency Adjudication, 22 Ao. L. REv. 515, 516 (1971).
104. The Environmental Protection Agency has promulgated a rule to this effect.
See 40 CFR § 2.107a(b) (1972).
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Information Specifically Given in Confidence
Information freely given with specific assurance by the government that it will be kept in confidence should be exempt. In Tobacco
°
Institute v. Federal Trade Commission,'"
the court found that the
controlling factor was whether confidentiality had been requested. The
Tobacco Institute sought access to the answers to questionnaires sent
to persons and organizations actively engaged or interested, in the
subject of smoking and health. About half of those responding requested confidential treatment. The court refused to order disclosure
of those questionnaires which were received in confidence.
The court in Nichols v. United States0 6 went so far as to hold
that even where the information was not obtained by a specific grant
of confidentiality the material would be protected if the assurance was
given later. The case involved a request from a pathologist for
material connected with the assassination of President Kennedy. The
material was given to the government by the estate of President
Kennedy without any request that it be protected from public disclosure. Later the Kennedy family was asked if it wished confidential
treatment and it responded affirmatively. Thus, at least in a sensitive
fact situation, combined with an explicit request for confidentiality,
courts will not require disclosure. Regardless of whether the information was given on the assurance of confidential treatment or the
expression was received after the information is in the possession of
the government, it appears that courts will generally protect information specifically given in confidence.
Citizens' Privilege in Dealing With the Government
The legislative history of the Act suggests that it is necessary to
balance the disclosure requirement against the right of privacy.'0°
Nevertheless a right should accrue to an individual citizen who must
deal with the government that information he supplies will be used
only for the purpose for which he supplied it and no other. Meticulous
care should be taken to avoid any danger of staff discretion infringing
on individual rights of privacy. Certain traditional privileges, such as
doctor-patient and attorney-client, should be spelled out. But more
importantly, a general privilege should be established for communication between the government and private individual - a government-citizen privilege.
105. Civil No. 3035-67 (D.D.C. April 11, 1968).
106. 325 F. Supp. 130 (D. Kan. 1971), aft'd, 460 F.2d 671 (10th
107. S. REP. No. 813, supra note 23, at 7.

Cir. 1972).
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A new sensitivity to the protection of the individual privacy when
dealing with the government has been emerging. 08 At present, the
Act does not afford this protection. 10 9 Exemption four does not go
far enough to assure privacy for those dealing with the government.
Exemption six'1 0 permits withholding personal and medical information, but is severely limited by the phrase "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.""' It is true that courts may hold that
agencies are not required to release personal information. 1 2 But the
Getman v. NLRB1 3 decision severely limits this exemption and suggests that minor invasions of privacy should give way to the public
right to know. In that case, Getman, a law professor, attempted to
gain access to the "Excelsior" lists of employees filed with the Board
by employers." 4 Since the list contained names and addresses of individual employees, the Board argued that release of the information
would interfere with the privacy of the employees. The court suggested that the employees' rights were not as important as the public
interest value of the academic study. It found that legislative history
indicated that only disclosure of intimate details was foreclosed." 5
Balancing of this sort seems both unnecessary and unwarranted.
The public does not have a need to know private information, and
108. This new sensitivity is evidenced by the numerous bills to limit the sale or
distribution of mailing lists by federal agencies. See, e.g., H.R. 327, 92d Cong., lst
Sess. (1971); H.R. 8903, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. 9738, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1971) ; H.R. 10020, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
109. "In essence, [the Act] reverses the traditional presumption in favor of personal privacy and places the burden on the information-holding agency to find a specific
statutory ground for refusing to honor a request for disclosure. In some instances the
Act not only has shifted the burden of proof, it apparently has increased it as well."
Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a New Technology
in an Information-Oriented Society, 67 MIcH. L. REv. 1089, 1194 (1969) (footnotes
omitted).
110. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970) states: "This section does not apply to matters
that are . . . (6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."
111. "The statute requires an invasion of personal privacy . . .so long as it is not
'clearly unwarranted.' The use of the word 'clearly' is a legitimate expression of a
policy judgment, although one may wonder about its wisdom." Davis, supra note 5,
at 798 (emphasis added).
112. Tuckinsky v. Selective Serv. Sys., 294 F. Supp. 803 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 418
F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1969), held that a draft counsellor could not have personal information about members of the selective service system and appeal board unless consent
was given to release the information.
113. 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
114. In accordance with a rule announced in Excelsior Underwear, Inc., 156
N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966), employers must furnish the Board with a list of the names and
addresses of all employees eligible to vote in an upcoming labor election.
115. 450 F.2d at 674-75.
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even if it did the individual has the right to have the information used
for the purpose for which the government obtained it and for no
other. He either has a right to privacy or does not, and no balancing
is necessary. However, the Getman conclusion is correct in one sense;
it is difficult to find protection within the Act, and information about
11 6
an individual may well be freely available.
This situation is aggravated by the fact that there is no requirement that exempt material be protected by agencies. Thus, even
exempt personal information will not be protected unless an agency
wishes to protect it." 7 In LaMorte v. Mansfield,"' a witness in a
Securities and Exchange Commission proceeding attempted to claim the
investigatory file exemption for testimony given by him in an agency
proceeding. Access was sought to the testimony in connection with a
litigation in which he was a defendant. The court held that a private
individual could not claim an exemption granted an agency under the
Act. Therefore, the private individual has no more protection than an
agency wishes to afford him even with respect to exempt material.
An unambiguous exemption for personal privacy should be established to cover any information supplied to the government by an
individual citizen, and application of the exemption by the agency
should be mandatory. A private individual should be protected from
the harassment which may emanate from the release of personal information by the government. Bureaucrats should not be permitted
any latitude in releasing private information.' 9
III.

MORE AMBITIOUS MODIFICATIONS

Despite the possible adjustments through judicial interpretations
which have been suggested above, the undeniable truth is that the Act
is not well suited for the task of providing public information. Judicial
legislation may provide a partial remedy if the courts begin to take a
pragmatic approach to providing public information. But if easily and
quickly obtainable information is to be supplied to the public, administrative or legislative innovations must be forthcoming. Two innovations are appropriate. First, active administrative enforcement must
replace passive judicial enforcement. Second, greater efforts must be
made to make everything not exempt available for public inspection
and copying.
116. But cf. Giannella, supra note 5, at 219.
117. See Miller, supra note 109, at 1195-96.
118. 438 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1971).
119. Miller, supra note 109, at 1199.
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Administrative Enforcement
Judicial enforcement in a public information system has not been
effective. 12 0 The courts are not equipped to handle this problem. They
can only sit passively and wait for cases to come to them. Thus,
judicial enforcement has not provided most citizens with the benefits
of the Act.' 2' Courts cannot provide the leadership and supervision
required for a comprehensive public information system." 2 Indeed,
judicial enforcement is not only inadequate, but also aggravates the
problem by increasing delay. Judicial enforcement is also made inadvisable by the overwhelming burden it places on the already overburdened courts.
A recommendation made in 1940 by the Attorney General's
Committee on Administrative Procedure may provide the type of
enforcement necessary for a viable public information system. The
Committee recommended the creation of a Director of Administrative Procedure - an administrative agency to oversee administrative
agencies.' 23 One of the Proposed tasks of the Director was that of
policing the public information policies of the various agencies. 2 ' In
the area of public information, this idea has even greater value today
than it did in the 1 940's, because judicial enforcement has been given
a test and has failed.
Government information will be made generally available only
if an executive entity is vested with sole responsibility for making it
available. A public information agency must be established that will
assume an active role. It must act both as an inspector general policing agencies' information policy - and as an ombudsman dealing with complaints through administrative procedures.
The Justice Department has set up "The Freedom of Information Committee" which reviews agency denials of access from the point
of view of defending the denial in court. 25 There is no doubt that
this group does a great deal to loosen the access policies of the agencies.
But it is passive in approach, and tends to weigh success in the courts
and resource allocation of trial staff more than it does the policy of
120. Giannella, supra note 5, at 225.
121. Nader, supra note 27, at 2.
122. Courts also are unable to cure deficiencies in agencies' staff work. Giannella,
supra note 5. at 225; Pharmaceutical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Gardner, 381 F.2d 271, 282 (D.C.
Cir. 1967) stated: "The courts sit to assure substantial fairness, not to discipline
agencies for awkwardness in their staff work."
123. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 7, at 123-26 - This proposal is a
touch of genius and continues to be a worthwhile proposal.
124. Proposed Bill, § 7, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 7, at 194.
125. H.R. REP. No. 92-1419, supra note 33, at 66-69.
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freeing access to information. The experience of this body does demonstrate, however, that an oversight group will assist in releasing information and that such an organization could be created by the
126
executive without further resort to Congress.
Public Inspection
The present scheme for obtaining access to government information consists of a request, with varying degrees of specificity, administrative search and determination, and often judicial review, before
access is granted. This procedure cannot provide free and fast information. Most of the six common complaints with respect to the
12 7
implementation of the Act found by the Administrative Conference
can be 'attributed to the technique established by the Act for releasing information.
The inherent defects in the system of the Act cannot be overcome merely by developing guidelines that a clerk can follow. The
information which is to be made available must be made available
quickly and in a useful manner. There will be no free and fast public
information until the available records can simply be pulled off a shelf
upon a request to clerical personnel.
All nonexempt documents should be available for public inspection at a convenient location.12 All agencies have public record rooms
where certain documents are available "across the counter." Records
available under this procedure need only be expanded to include all
information to which access is required under the Act. Because screening and segregating of the documents will be done beforehand, no
cumbersome administrative determinations or clerical decisions will
be required.
In implementing this policy, it would be desirable to establish an
official in each agency whose duty it is to make information available.
Anything that is developed in a final form within the agency excluding current internal memoranda and material in a working
126. "This committee also is convinced that the FOI Committee and the Office
of Legal Counsel [of the Department of Justice] could - and should - exercise
more of a leadership and coordinating function to improve the administrative machinery
as well as to foster a more positive attitude in the Federal bureaucracy toward the
basic principles and goals of the FOI Act." Id. at 68.
127. These were: (1) equality of access;
overly formal requirement; (3) delay; (4)
information; (5) resistance to disclosure by
form fee for locating and copying. Giannella,
128. See Nader, supra note 27, at 15.

(2) evasive and obstructive practices commingling of exempt and nonexempt
lower level staff; and (6) lack of unisupra note 5, at 221-25.
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investigatory file12 9 - should pass through this official before they
are included in a permanent file. This official should be responsible
for setting up the procedure. He and his staff should review all these
records. If the material does not come under an exemption, then it
should be indexed and placed on public display. If it does come within an exemption, and a decision is made to withhold it, then it should
be described in an index and reasons given for withholding.
This procedure will permit the media the quick access which they
require. It will permit researchers the latitude to make searching expeditions in agencies' records using primarily their own resources and
only a small amount of the agencies' resources. Most importantly, this
procedure will provide access indistinguishably as to interest involved."'
This procedure will also solve one problem which unsuccessful
applicants now face. At present, there is no immediate requirement
that withheld information be identified or reasons given for denial.
Documents are withheld without the requesting party knowing what
he has not seen or why he has not seen it.
This method of disclosure would take advantage of the fact that
those inside an agency understand the records and can organize and
compile the information in a useable form.' 31 It is vital that information be well organized and retrievable, and only agency personnel can
successfully manage the records.
It is also hoped this procedure will change the attitude of the
agencies' staff towards disclosure. At present, it is easier to withhold
documents than to release them, and hence agency personnel find that
to deny access is in their own best interest.132 It is predicted that
imposing a greater burden for withholding documents, while making
1 3
it relatively easy to release them, will do much to encourage release.
As the Senate Report said, "[flor the great majority of different
records, the public as a whole has a right to know what its Govern129. These would, of course, be placed in the process for release immediately upon
loss of "current" status.
130. APA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 8, at 198 states: "The section [section
3] has been drawn upon the theory that administrative operations and procedures are
public property which the general public, rather than a few specialists or lobbyists, is entitled to know or to have the ready means of knowing with definiteness and assurance."
131. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 7, at 26.
132. See Giannella, supra note 5, at 224.
133. Statement of John R. Quarles, Jr., Assistant Administrator for Enforcement
and General Counsel, Environmental Protection Agency, 1972 Hearings, supra note 34,
at 1877: "Thus, staff personnel must go to some trouble to deny a request, while
granting a request is less troublesome since high-level clearance is not needed. We
hope and expect that this procedure will encourage staff personnel to respond promptly
and affirmatively to requests for information."
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ment is doing."'- 4 When motivated away from seeing danger in
every exposure, agencies will find that most documents can be made
public as a matter of course without doing injury to their function.
The Administrative Conference considered greater use of public
inspection and rejected that approach. It suggested that use of that
approach would result in mechanical insertion of material into closed
files rather than true exercise of agency discretion.1 5 However, this
result does not necessarily follow from a public inspection system.
First, if the agencies honestly try to comply with the Act, very little
information will not be made public, assuming that the recommendations earlier made as to investigatory files and internal memoranda
are implemented. Second, there is no reason an agency cannot exercise its discretion in special cases under a public inspection procedure.
Indeed, the index of withheld documents will facilitate special requests
for nonpublic information.
The agencies generally resist giving specific reasons for withholding documents,1 36 but the reasons will facilitate the auditing and
enforcement of the Act. Moreover, as mentioned above, the extra
burden of giving reasons for withholding each document will provide
incentive to resist the temptation to withhold questionable documents.
To universally accomplish this policy will require congressional
or executive action. However, there are examples of judicial orders
requiring agencies to grant public inspection of nonexempt material
and to index material which cannot be disclosed.
In Irons v. Schuyler,"' the applicant sought all the unpublished
manuscript opinions of the Patent Office. The court found that the
request was so broad as to be burdensome since the opinions contained
some information which would be protected by the Act and release
would require unreasonable effort to segregate disclosable material.
Although it refused to order the agency to disclose the information, it
This
did require indexing in compliance with § 552(a)(2)(c). 3l'
section is limited to matters formally considered by the agency and
cannot be read to extend to all records required by the Act to be disclosed. However, the rationale of Irons is worth noting. The court
held that it could not require disclosure under so broad a request but
134. S. REP. No. 813, supra note 23, at 5.
135. Giannella, supra note 5, at 242-43.
136. Id. at 255.
137. 321 F. Supp. 628 (D.D.C. 1970).
2
Each Agency also shall main138. 5 U.S.C. § 55 (a) (2) (C) (1970) states "...
tain and make available for public inspection and copying a current index providing
identifying information for the public as to any matter issued, adopted, or promulgated
after July 4, 1967, and required by this paragraph to be made available or published."
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ordered the agency to index the documents so a reasonable request
could be fashioned. An index of documents which are in the possession
of the agency, but not to be released, permits everyone - the requesting party, the courts, and probably the agency itself - to focus any
controversy on information actually available. Indexing should be
considered by courts more frequently when they are faced with questions of overly broad requests rather than upholding denial of access
or putting the agency to an impossible burden.
In United States v. Leichtfuss,3 9 the applicant requested access
to Selective Service directives and manuals. The court found that the
documents should have been made available under the Act. But the
court went further, and found that the applicant and others like him
should not be required to file a formal request under the Act each
time disclosure of the documents was desired. It found that such a
procedure would serve no purpose; in addition it would burden the
agency and the applicant, and would inject unnecessary delay into
the granting of access to documents already designated for release.
Therefore, the court ordered the records to be made available in a
convenient place for anyone to inspect and copy. Courts could so order
where the same information is likely to be requested repeatedly.
Realistically, easily and quickly obtainable public information can
only result from a major modification in the public information system.
An administrative agency assigned to enforce the Act is the only
means which will assure adequate enforcement and active leadership
in implementing a public information system. Only an "over the
counter" access system will make information realistically available
to all users.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The problems inherent in the effort to achieve fair and effective
administration of a public information policy transcend the needs of
individual applicants. These problems must be considered within the
broad spectrum of the administrative process. Unfortunately, Congress
did not write a statute which lends itself easily to efficient implementation of a freedom of information system within the total administrative
process. Moreover, the courts have followed a rather narrow and
myopic approach to implementing the Act. 4 °
139. 331 F. Supp. 723 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
140. Recently, the Supreme Court in Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink,
41 U.S.L.W. 4201 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1973) made an effort to rationalize the judicial
approach to implementation of the Act. Although the major portion of the opinion
relates to exemption one [see note 54 supra and accompanying text] its most interesting aspect is its approach to judicial scrutiny under exemption five. In direct conflict
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The inherent deficiencies of the Act and the unrealistic decisions
of the judiciary have resulted in continual criticism of the agencies.
Although bureaucrats have not been overly enthusiastic in complying
with the Act, it seems somewhat unfair to focus all adverse comment
on them. Indeed, many agencies have labored diligently to carry out
the congressional mandate as they see it. Moreover, one should not
underestimate the effects of the guerilla activities of "public interest"
bureaucrats.
This article has suggested that the task for the courts and the
critics of the present public information system is to modify the
approach of the Act and the information system in general in order
to make it possible to realistically expect a free and fast flow of information from the federal government. The suggested interpretations of the Act attempt to indicate methods for avoiding the present
ad hoc approach and for incorporating into decisions considerations
of the practical difficulties in making records available. The suggested
interpretations, while recognizing the burden on the agencies, are not
intended to provide less access, and are indeed intended ultimately to
provide more disclosure of agencies' records. Suggested also are
modifications beyond the authority of the judiciary but within easy
reach of others. These too represent an attempt to build workability
into the public information system so that more information can reasonably be made available.
The constant flailings of those dissatisfied with implementation of
the Act cannot produce any positive change and can only result in
continued use of a frustrating and basically faulty system. It is simply
time we moved off center and approached the problems of a public
information system rationally.
with the trend of circuit court decisions, the Court held that "in camera inspection
of all documents is not a necessary or inevitable tool in every case." Id. at 4207.
Thus, an agency by various means short of submission of all the documents may be
able to show to a court's satisfaction that it has complied with the Act. For instance,
an agency may by affidavit or oral testimony demonstrate that the "surrounding circumstances" support a finding that the withheld documents are "advisory" and
contain no severable "purely factual" material or that the edited versions it voluntarily released contain the entire disclosable portion of the documents. The Court
also sanctioned in camera inspection of a representative document only. This holding
will absolve the district courts from performing many of the largely clerical functions
previously required of them. It constitutes a clear recognition that methods utilized
by courts in handling traditional discovery are not practical in reviewing access
questions under the Act.

